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This paper demonstrates that deviations from the law of one price are an important source
of violations of absolute PPP across countries. Using highly disaggregated U.S. export data, we
document evidence of systematic international price discrimination based on the local wage of con-
sumers in the destination market. We show that most violations from absolute PPP can also be
explained by international diﬀerences in wages. We ﬁnd very little additional explanation is due to
diﬀerences in income per capita. Developing and calibrating a model of pricing-to-market based on
search frictions and international productivity diﬀerences, we show that pricing-to-market accounts
for 62 percent of the relationship between national price levels and income and 100 percent of the
deviation from the law of one price. In contrast, the textbook Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect
accounts for the remaining 38 percent of the relationship between national price levels and income.
JEL classiﬁcations: E31, F12. Keywords: PPP, Pricing-To-Market, Law of One Price.
11. Introduction
Absolute purchasing power parity (PPP) is one of the best known and most easily rejected
ideas in economics. Across countries, there are substantial diﬀerences in the general price level so
that the same basket of goods sells for a diﬀerent price depending on the country in which it is sold.1
A well-documented feature of this dispersion in prices is that price levels are strongly positively
correlated with real per capita GDP, so that agents in low-income countries pay considerably less
for the same basket of goods than agents in high-income countries.2
The dominant explanation for the relationship between income per capita and the price level
is based on international diﬀerences in total factor productivity in the tradable sector. According to
Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964), and Samuelson (1964) (HBS hereafter), rich countries are relatively
more productive in tradables than nontradables. If the law of one price holds in the tradable
sector, then international relative wages are determined by productivity diﬀerences in tradables.
If productivity diﬀerences are relatively small in the nontradable sector, this implies that both
nontradables and the common basket of goods are less expensive in low-income countries.
A central feature of the HBS explanation is the assumption that the law of one price holds
for tradable goods. This is clearly violated in the data; substantial deviations from the law of one
price exist for both tradables and nontradables. Using highly disaggregated data, Heston, Atten,
and Nuxoll (1995) and Crucini, Telmer, and Zachariadis (2001) ﬁnd that international deviations
from the law of one price for tradables and nontradables are of nearly the same magnitude. Using
data from the U.N. International Comparison Programme, Eaton and Kortum (2001) document
1For instance, in nearly half the countries in the Penn World Tables in 2000, a common basket of goods was less
than one-third as expensive as in the United States, when prices are converted using nominal exchange rates. These
substantial departures from PPP are quite persistent, as 10 years earlier, in 28 of the 51 countries for which we have
data, the price level was still less than a third of the US price level. These countries with low price levels also have
very low income, with GDP per capita on average one-tenth that of the U.S. level.
2See Kravis and Lipsey (1983, 1987, and 1988). Rogoﬀ (1996) provides a review of PPP.
2substantial dispersion in the price of highly tradable investment goods across countries. They also
ﬁnd evidence that low-income countries pay less than high-income countries for investment goods.
Pharmaceutical drug prices provide a striking example of the dispersion in international prices for
identical goods, as well as evidence of international price discrimination based on income (Danzon
and Furukawa 2003).
In this paper we explore the quantitative contribution of deviations from the law of one price
in tradables to the relationship between national price level and income. Using highly disaggregated
data on exports from the United States to diﬀe r e n tc o u n t r i e s ,w ed o c u m e n tt h a tU . S .e x p o r t e r s
systematically charge higher prices for the same good when exporting to high-income countries.
These data are well suited to isolating the role of this type of pricing-to-market because they
measure export prices at the U.S. border before any local nontraded inputs are added. We ﬁnd
pricing-to-market to be substantial, since the richest country in our sample pays, on average, 49
percent more than the poorest country for the same good.
Next, we develop a model of pricing-to-market based on search frictions and international
productivity diﬀerences similar to Alessandria (2002). In our model, countries diﬀer in total factor
productivity. Additionally, consumers have imperfect information on where to ﬁnd goods at the
lowest price and must actively search. When deciding the optimal trade-oﬀ between additional
searching or accepting a higher price, consumers consider the opportunity cost of search. Since
search takes time, this opportunity cost depends on the forgone wage, and hence the price consumers
accept also depends on the local wage. Consumers from more productive countries have relatively
high wages; so they are willing to accept higher prices to avoid diverting more resources from labor
to search. Firms take this into account and set relatively high prices in these high-income countries.
This produces a tight link between prices and the local wage.
That it is wages, and not income per capita, that generates pricing-to-market is conﬁrmed by
3the data. That is, using a subset of PWT countries for which we also have manufacturing wages, we
ﬁnd that international diﬀerences in wages explain substantially more of the violations from absolute
PPP than income per capita. Moreover, in a simple linear regression of prices on both wages and
income per capita, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on income per capita is no longer signiﬁcant.
We also use our model to quantitatively distinguish between the traditional HBS eﬀect and
our pricing-to-market channel. With no HBS eﬀect, we ﬁnd that the pricing-to-market accounts for
approximately 44 percent of the deviations from PPP and 87 percent of the deviations from the
LOP in the data. With technological progress that is faster in the tradable sector, we ﬁnd that
pricing-to-market of the form considered here accounts for 62 percent of the violations of absolute
PPP and nearly 100 percent of the deviations from the LOP. In contrast, changes in the price
of nontradables to tradables, as emphasized by HBS, account for only 38 percent of violations of
absolute PPP.
Pricing-to-market is the dominant factor explaining PPP deviations because it is both em-
pirically substantial and applies to all goods, not just a subset of nontraded goods. In our pricing-
to-market model, technological progress biased toward tradables has an important two-fold role in
explaining violations from PPP. First, there is the traditional HBS mechanism making nontradables
relatively more expensive in high-income countries. Second, with technological progress biased to-
wards tradables, the wage gap between countries is relatively large compared to real income. These
larger international wage diﬀerences lead to larger deviations from the LOP for both tradables and
nontradables. Consequently, with pricing-to-market we ﬁnd that tradable productivity growth only
needs to be about 60 percent faster than nontradable productivity growth to explain the relation-
ship between PPP and income, whereas with the traditional HBS model, tradable productivity must
grow 10 times faster than nontradable productivity.
A few existing theories present alternatives to HBS in explaining the systematic deviations
4from absolute PPP. Kravis and Lipsey (1983) and Bhagwati (1984) attribute these deviations to
substantial diﬀerences in factor endowments.3 Dornbusch (1988) and Neary (1988), building on the
ideas of Linder (1961), focus on diﬀerences in tastes across countries. Bergstrand (1991) explains
price levels in a model with nonhomothetic preferences in which nontraded goods are luxuries and
traded goods are necessities. Bergstrand ﬁnds evidence that demand considerations are important
determinants of national diﬀerences in price levels. Along with the HBS theory, these competing
theories assume that the law of one price holds for tradables and therefore cannot account for the
large and persistent deviations from the law of one price in traded goods.
Our explanation for deviations from absolute PPP complements previous theories based
on supply and demand considerations. In our model, high-income countries have a comparative
advantage in the production of market goods relative to search services. Since search services are
not traded, they are less expensive in low-income countries, and this makes demand by low-income
consumers more elastic. To consume goods, consumers must produce nontraded search services. As
i nH B St h e n ,t h et r u ec o s to faﬁnal good includes a nontraded search component. However, unlike
in HBS, because consumers have imperfect information on where to buy goods inexpensively, ﬁrms
can price discriminate internationally so that the price of the traded good diﬀers across countries.
This paper is also related to two other recent literatures that have emphasized the role of
absolute PPP in understanding economic growth and international ﬂuctuations. In the growth
literature, international prices are often used both to make welfare comparisons across countries
and to measure total factor productivity. Hsieh and Klenow (2003) and Eaton and Kortum (2001)
demonstrate that the variation in prices of tradables across countries is important for explaining
cross-country variation in incomes. In the international business-cycle literature, recent work by
3These authors propose a model with two internationally immobile factors. Poor countries are abundantly endowed
with labor relative to capital. If consumption tastes are the same in rich and poor countries and factor endowments
so dissimilar that they specialize in diﬀerent tradables, wages will be lower in poor countries, as will the price of the
relatively labor-intensive nontradable.
5Engel (1993, 1999), Asea and Mendoza (1994), and Chari, Kehoe, McGrattan (2002) has found that
the HBS model cannot account for ﬂuctuations in real exchange rates at business-cycle frequencies.
Alessandria (2002) shows that pricing-to-market of the form considered here increases the volatility
of international relative prices over the business cycle.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the aggregate and disaggregate
data relationship between prices, income, and wages. In section 3, we introduce a two-country, three-
good model of international price discrimination. Section 4 discusses and evaluates the quantitative
implications of the model in relation to the empirical ﬁndings of section 2. Section 5 concludes.
2. Empirics
The data show a strong positive relationship between the price levels of tradables and the
income levels of countries, both at the aggregate level and in the micro data. Aggregate macro
evidence is presented in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows a strong positive relationship between PPP
price levels and income levels in the cross-section of countries using data from Penn World Table 6.1,
where prices are based on ICP data on ﬁnal prices of goods. A linear regression of the relationship
i nF i g u r e1p r o d u c e sas i g n i ﬁcant elasticity estimate of 0.393. Although nontradables contribute
to this relationship, the price of observable tradables shows a similar relationship. For example,
Figure 2 shows a positive relationship between aggregate equipment prices and income per capita
in a cross-section of countries. Since a price measure for tradables is unavailable, and equipment is
considered more tradable than consumption goods, the price level for equipment is used. A linear
regression of the relationship in Figure 2 produces a signiﬁcant elasticity estimate of 0.13.
These aggregate data suﬀer from three important problems for evaluating the source of the
relationship between prices and income. First, although equipment is an important component, it
is not the only component of tradables.
Second, the equipment priced in diﬀerent countries may be of very diﬀerent quality. If
6wealthier countries consume higher quality tradables, on average, prices may reﬂect quality variation.
Thus, the positive price-income relationship observed for tradables may not be at odds with the
H B Sm o d e la ta l l ,b u tc o u l ds i m p l yb ea na r t i f a c to f these three data issues. Indeed, Eaton and
Kortum (2001) and Hsieh and Klenow (2003) cite quality variation as a potential explanation for
the aggregate relationship.
Finally, the ICP data use ﬁnal goods prices. Thus, these prices include variations in ship-
ping costs, tax structures, and costs of nontradable components (e.g., distribution, retailing, etc.)
Shipping costs (Clark, Dollar and Micco, 2004) and tariﬀs (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) tend to be
larger for exports to poorer countries. Thus, if ﬁrms price discriminate, the aggregate data may
underestimate the amount of price discrimination. Eaton and Kortum and Hsieh and Klenow have
conjectured that inexpensive nontradable distribution costs lead to lower ﬁnal prices of tradables
in low-income countries. However, large productivity diﬀerences in distribution, retailing, etc. be-
tween rich and poor countries may actually make distribution services, the relevant nontradables,
relatively more expensive in poor countries. For example, Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003) ﬁnd
that distribution costs amounted to an additional 64 percent of the price of goods in Argentina
compared to just 45 percent in the U.S. In any case, the measured price-income relationship could
be distorted by diﬀering costs included in ﬁnal goods prices.
The micro data we analyze, U.S. Exports Harmonized System (1989-2001) data (see Feenstra
et al. (2002)), helps us to bypass each of the above potential problems in determining the source
of the relationship between prices and income but yields similar results. Beyond allowing us to
examine the international deviations of the law of one price in addition to deviations from PPP, these
microdata have signiﬁcant advantages over the aggregate data in the three dimensions mentioned
above.
First, the data are comprehensive of all U.S. domestic exports (i.e., excluding re-exports) and
7therefore include only tradable goods as well as a broad range of tradables beyond investment goods.
We have annual totals of the quantities and value of commodities exported to all 182 destination
countries. We can link these export data to GDP per capita for 128 countries from the Penn World
Table 6.1. For 28 of these countries we also have manufacturing wage data from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Second, the issue of quality is mitigated for two reasons. First, the data all come from the
United States, and so the goods are likely to be more homogeneous in quality than goods coming
from all countries (including the destination country) as with the ICP equipment prices. Second,
the data include 10,741 commodities classiﬁed using the 10-digit Harmonized System product codes,
and so it is extremely disaggregated. We drop any commodity with a description containing words
like “other,”4 “not elsewhere speciﬁed or included,” “NESOI,” and “parts” because they are likely
to be heterogeneous groups. We also drop commodities containing “$” (e.g., goods categorized by
their price level). This reduced set of 5,527 detailed product groups is more likely to be homogeneous
goods.5 (Appendix A provides the names of 30 randomly selected goods from the dataset as an
e x a m p l eo ft h el e v e lo fd e t a i l . )
Finally, export prices are based on free-along-side ship values,6 and so they do not include
transportation costs, tariﬀs, and nontradable components such as distribution and retailing costs
in the importing country. One complication, however, is that we do not directly observe prices.
Instead, the data include the total value and quantity sold, and so we calculate unit values.
4We allow the phrase “other than” because it speciﬁes a higher level of detail.
5Several variations of standards for determining “homogeneous” goods (i.e., dropping goods based on the detailed
product description only, dropping goods based on the abridged production description only, and dropping goods that
lacked units) as well as several methods for dealing with the role of outliers (i.e., dropping low value observations,
dropping low quantity observations, dropping commodities whose price variation was deemed unrealistic, and robust
regression) were examined. While their magnitudes vary somewhat, the fact that coeﬃcients were quantitatively
important and signiﬁcant was robust to these diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
6The free-alongside-ship value is the selling price or cost if not sold, including inland freight, insurance, and other
charges to the U.S. port of export, but excluding unconditional discounts and commissions. It is essentially the price
received by the exporting country before shipment.
8We present three essential ﬁndings from the data: 1) rich countries typically pay higher prices
for the same exports than poor countries and the relationship is strong, sizable, and signiﬁcant; 2)
this relationship is linked more closely to the destination countries’ levels of wages than their income
per capita levels.; and 3) this relationship is not likely driven by unobserved variation in quality.
Indeed, any unobserved variation in quality may very well understate the relationship.
For expositional purposes, consider the case of a monopolist selling the identical good i in
diﬀerent markets (e.g., countries) j. Given a common cost but diﬀerent demand, the ﬁrm will, in
general, charge price p equal to a market-varying markup µ over a common marginal cost c. Hence,
marginal costs may vary across goods, and markups will vary across goods and destination markets:
lnpijt =l ncit + µijt
The purpose is to examine whether µijt, the markup charged on good i at time t to destination
country j is related to the level of income per capita or wages of that country. We focus on the 28
countries for which both wage and income per capita data are available, which nonetheless constitute
76 percent of all exports in the full sample. Results using GDP per capita for all 128 countries for
which GDP per capita data are available are comparable7 and are presented in Appendix B.
Table 1 presents the estimated coeﬃcients from regressions of log price level on log income
and/or log wages, where variation in lncit is controlled through ﬁxed eﬀects for each commodity-
year combination. We measure incomes in prices in both PPP and exchange rate terms, since it is
not entirely obvious which method of deﬂation is most appropriate given the model we present in
Section 3. The ﬁrst row of the table gives the estimates using all the (homogeneous good) data and
7The qualitative ﬁndings in the full sample (128 countries) match the reduced sample (28 countries) for GDP
per capita, but the magnitudes of estimates were much more sensitive to the choice of which goods to deﬁne as
“homogeneous”, and to outliers. (Robust regressions produced the strongest results, for example.) To get rid of
outliers, believed to be the result of measurement error, we dropped commodities with no units given from the full
country sample.
9measuring log incomes and wages in PPP terms. The “GDP per Capita Only” estimate, from a
regression where log GDP per capita is the only regressor (in addition to the ﬁxed eﬀects), yields an
elasticity estimate of 18.2 percent. The “Wage Only” estimate is somewhat smaller at 16.6 percent.
Though both estimates are highly signiﬁcant, when we include log wages and log GDP per capita
together in the same regression, log wages win the horse race hands down. These estimates are
presented in the right-most two columns. The estimated coeﬃcient on wages remains at nearly the
same level (15.5 percent) and is highly signiﬁcant, while the GDP per capita coeﬃcient estimates
become much smaller (2.1 percent) and is much less signiﬁcant.8
The second and third rows of the uppermost table show that these results do not hinge on
outliers. If we drop observations where the total value exported to a given country is less than 1
percent or 5 percent of the total value of the commodity exported to all countries in a given year,
many observations are dropped but the quantitative estimates remain similar and highly signiﬁcant.
The lower table presents analogous results except that income and wages have been converted
to a common currency using nominal exchange rates for these regressions. In these estimates, the
pattern between log wages and log income per capita is unchanged, but all of the measured elasticities
are smaller in exchange rate terms (13.6 percent for income per capita and 12.6 percent for wages)
than the estimates using PPP-based measures (again, 18.2 percent for income per capita and 16.6
percent for wages).
Based on the estimates in Table 1, the magnitude of the price-wage relationship is potentially
large. In 2000, the diﬀerence in log wages between the richest and poorest countries in the data
set (Germany and Sri Lanka, respectively) was 3.9 measured in exchange rate terms (2.4 in PPP
terms). Hence, the implied price diﬀerences in U.S. exports to these countries would be 49 percent
8Nevertheless, the estimate of this coeﬃcient usually (the lower table in Table 1 shows an exception) remains
statistically signiﬁcant. Since our data is for manufacturing wages, it may be that the data are an imperfect proxy
for the average wage overall and so some of the average wage variation that is independent of our proxy is captured
by income per capita.
10(40 percent using PPP).
Although the data are extremely disaggregated, as stated above, one might still suspect that
the positive relationships uncovered are driven by unobserved variation in quality, with wealthy
countries tending to import higher quality (and thus higher priced) goods within the 10-digit com-
modity categories. Since any variation in quality within 10-digit categories is unobservable, this
cannot be ruled out. However, in terms of observable variation in quality the tendency is actually
in the opposite direction. That is, poorer countries import higher quality (e.g., higher priced) goods
from the U. S., on average.
To show this, we replicate the regressions using broader categories of goods. Table 2 shows
that estimates from ﬁxed eﬀect regressions like those in Table 1 are systematically lower for regres-
sions using these aggregated heterogeneous categories than for those with disaggregated categories.
The aggregated product categories are produced by dropping digits from the 10-digit classiﬁcation
system and summing the quantities and values exported across all categories.9 For example, in the
9-digit case, all categories that are identical up to the ﬁrst nine digits are summed together into a
single observation. Only 307 commodities are unique up to all ten digits and these are combined into
133 heterogenous 9-digit categories. As more digits are dropped, the categories become broader and
more heterogeneous, more goods are combined into groups, and more observations can be included
in the regressions. For example, at ﬁve digits artiﬁcial Christmas trees are simply artiﬁcial Christ-
mas trees, while at seven digits these are subdivided into plastic and nonplastic artiﬁcial Christmas
trees, one of which may have higher average prices and therefore be considered higher quality arti-
ﬁcial Christmas trees. (A random selection showing how categories are combined at diﬀerent levels
9A nice feature of this approach is that it answers an easy question in relation to the data, “What would the
regressions look like if the data were less disaggregated?” Unfortunately, aggregation eﬀectively reweights observations
by the quantity transacted. An alternative approach, which gives every observation the same weight in both regressions,
is to run regressions on the disaggregate data and compare 1) the estimates of regressions with ﬁxed eﬀects for
each disaggregated commodity and 2) the regressions with ﬁxed eﬀects for the larger aggregated commodities. The
disaggregated and aggregated (at diﬀerent levels) estimates were nearly identical and so would imply no quality bias
in either direction.
11is given in Appendix C.) For all of these aggregations, the estimates in Table 2 are systematically
lower using the heterogeneous categories than with the disaggregated data. Hence, we conclude that
poorer countries may actually import higher quality goods from the U.S.
The relationship is so surprising that the claim bears further explaining. The data are
not implying that poor countries tend to consume higher quality goods on average than wealthy
countries do, only that they tend to import (from the U. S.) higher quality goods. Perhaps, poor
countries have inexpensive domestic substitutes for low-quality but not high quality goods. Hence,
imports from the U.S. are weighted toward high-quality goods. That is, the U.S. has a stronger
comparative advantage in high quality goods relative to poor countries than relative to other high-
income countries. Another possibility is that as countries develop, they invest in capital that is closer
to the frontier than the installed base of capital in developed countries. If a substantial fraction of
developed country trade involves replacing existing capital rather than upgrading, we could expect
to see this quality eﬀect. However, explaining the source of this eﬀect is outside the scope of this
paper.
Again, we cannot deﬁnitively rule out or sign a bias that might come from unobserved vari-
ation in quality in our goods categories. However, if our 10-digit categories are indeed aggregations
of goods that are heterogeneous in quality, a natural prior given the evidence would be to assume
that they follow the pattern observed at all other levels of aggregation. In that case, we view the
estimates in Table 1 as conservative estimates of the extent of the true price-income relationship.
The estimated elasticities will be used as benchmarks for quantitatively evaluating the ex-
planatory power of the model developed in Section 4. We therefore summarize the main ﬁndings of
this section:
• The macro data yield an elasticity of violations of PPP with respect to PPP income per capita
levels of 39 percent.
12• The elasticity of deviation in the law of one price with respect to PPP income per capita is
about 20 percent.
• The corresponding law of one price elasticity is slightly smaller with respect to wages (16
percent in exchange-rate terms), but the relationship is stronger.
• The elasticities are smaller (14 percent for income per capita and 13 percent for wages) if
exchange-rate conversions are used.
The micro evidence shows that pricing-to-market is an important source of the violations from
PPP. In thinking about a model of pricing-to-market, the fact that wages are the important driving
factor points toward a model where variations in time costs yield variations in the price elasticity
of demand across countries (as in our search model), rather than a model where nonhomothetic
preferences and income eﬀects drive these diﬀerences in the elasticity of demand.
3. Model
This section develops a two-country, three-good model in which there is a positive relationship
between disaggregate and aggregate international relative prices and wages and income as a result
of pricing-to-market. In this model, ﬁrms charge higher prices on average in those countries where
wages are higher. Consumers in these high wage countries accept these higher prices because they
have a high opportunity cost of time and are thus less willing to search repeatedly.
There are three imperfectly substitutable goods j = {1,2,3} and two countries denoted
i = {1,2}. Goods 1 and 2 are tradables with good 1 produced exclusively in country 1 and good
2 produced exclusively in country 2. Both countries can produce good 3, but it is not tradable.
Including both tradables and nontradables allows us to distinguish between pricing-to-market and
the traditional HBS eﬀect.
In each country, there are many stores, each specializing in the sale of a single type of
13good. For simplicity we assume that the measure of each type of store in each country is the same.
Households do not know the price charged at any store and must physically visit a store to discover
its price. As in Diamond (1971), because search takes time and is imprecise, stores have some
monopoly power over consumers and thus may charge diﬀerent prices for the same good.10
Households must send out shoppers to search for the lowest price quotes and purchase goods.
Each shopper can buy at most one unit of the good. Shopping therefore takes time away from
work and is imperfect in the sense that consumers do not simultaneously receive price quotes from
all the stores in the market. We model search as noisy, as in Burdett and Judd (1983), so that a
fraction q of shoppers receive a single price quote while the remaining shoppers (1 − q) receive two
price quotes. The probability a shopper receives a single price quote is random and equals q. After
receiving either one or two price quotes, the shopper must decide whether to purchase a single good
at the lowest price quote received or return home empty-handed.
Although without searching, agents do not know the price charged at a speciﬁcs t o r e ,t h e yd o
have perfect information about the distribution of prices in the economy. The distribution of prices
p set by stores selling good j in country i is denoted by Gij(p). Search is directed in the sense that a
shopper from country j looking for good i receives only domestic price quotes for good j, i.e., price
quotes from the distribution Gij(.). Since the shopper can buy at most one unit of the good, only
the lowest price quote received by a shopper is relevant to the shopper’s purchase decision. The
distribution of lowest price quotes received by shoppers is then
Hij (p)=qGij (p)+( 1− q)
h




From the ﬁrm’s perspective, noisy search makes the consumers heterogenous in that some
10In principle one could allow for more heterogeneity in the types of tradable goods produced in each country,
but this would complicate the analysis without changing our result: the price charged would still depend on the
opportunity cost of search of consumers.
14shoppers will only have one price quote, while others will have multiple price quotes. Consumers
with multiple price quotes will diﬀer in their second price quote. As ﬁrms can not distinguish
between these diﬀerent customers, the price they charge will inﬂuence both the proﬁtp e rs a l ea n d
the share of shoppers with multiple price quotes that they attract.
A. Consumer’s Problem
The structure of the consumer’s problem is similar to that in Alessandria (2002). In each
country, there are many identical families. We use lower case variables to denote the decision rules
of individual households and upper case variables to denote aggregate decision rules. Each family is
composed of a large number of agents, normalized to a continuum of measure one.11 The problem of
a family is to divide between shoppers and workers and to give shoppers instructions on which prices
to accept. A household in country i must choose the number of agents nij to send out shopping





nij + li =1 ,
Alessandria (2002) shows that it is optimal to send each agent shopping for good j with a reservation
price rule to purchase only if the lowest price quote is below some reservation level, rij.T h e
consumption of good j by country i consumers depends therefore on both the reservation price and
the measure of shoppers. Because there are many shoppers sent out for each good, there is no
uncertainty in the amount of goods consumed, which equals:
(2) cij = nijHij (rij).
11We assume each family is comprised of only agents from the same country.







which is clearly increasing in reservation price.
The representative home family chooses reservation prices and shoppers for each good to
solve the following problem:
Ui =m a x
{ri,ci}






j pij (rij)cij = wili + Πi,
equations (1), (2), (3)
where Ui is the utility function in country i and Πi is the proﬁts earned by country i ﬁrms.
In this framework, consumers can adjust consumption along two margins, either by changing
the number of shoppers or the price they will accept. If there is an interior solution, the problem










,j =2 ,3 (5)
where Uij is the marginal utility of good j.
Equation (4) is an arbitrage condition that implies, at the margin, the family is indiﬀerent
between increasing consumption by purchasing at the reservation price or sending out additional
shoppers, whose opportunity cost of search is measured in terms of the forgone wage, and purchasing
at the average price of the good in the market. With a reservation price of rij, the family expects
16to send out 1/H (rij) shoppers to purchase a single unit. Since the reservation price is linked to
t h et r u ec o s to ft h eg o o d ,i ti st h i sc o s tt h a tm a t t e r sa tt h em a r g i n ;t h e r e f o r e ,t h ef a m i l yc h o o s e s
consumption so that the marginal rate of substitution between any two goods equals the ratio of
their reservation prices as in equation (5).
Our focus is on diﬀerence in prices across countries with diﬀerent incomes and therefore
we have focused on a representative consumer in each country. However, it is straightforward
to extend the model to permit heterogeneity in wages. In this case, we see from equation (4) that
consumers with high wages will search less intensively than consumers with low wages. McKenzie and
Schargrodsky (2004) ﬁnd evidence of precisely this behavior. Using a unique dataset on consumer
purchasing behavior in Argentina, they ﬁnd that consumers in the 10th percentile of income spend
about 30 percent more time shopping per purchase than consumers in the 90th percentile of income.
B. Firm’s Problem
There are many ﬁrms in each country specialized in the production of either the country’s
tradable or nontradable good. The ﬁrms within a country are ex ante identical. Labor is the only
input into production, and one unit of labor in country j produces aT
j units of the tradable good
(good j)a n da n daNT
j units of the nontradable good (good 3). To focus on international price
discrimination, we assume that ﬁrms can costlessly sell their goods in either country through the
pre-established outlets.12
We focus on the problem of a representative ﬁrm in country j selling the tradable good (good
j)i nc o u n t r yi. Even though ﬁrms produce the same good, the search frictions give each ﬁrm some
monopoly power and leads ﬁrms to behave as monopolistic competitors.13 Each ﬁrm takes the
12Introducing domestic intermediaries to purchase abroad and sell domestically would not alter our results as ﬁrms
selling to the intermediaries would take into account the elasticity of demand of domestic consumers when setting
prices.
13Our model is similar in spirit to the traditional macro model with monopolistic competition and Dixit-Stiglitz
preferences. The main diﬀerence is that the elasticity of substitution between varieties depends endogenously on the
search structure.
17distribution of prices charged by other ﬁrms selling the same good, Gij, the number of price quotes
that it delivers, the reservation price of consumers, Rij, and the unit cost of production, wi/aT
i ,
as given. Given the constant returns to scale production, the amount of sales does not inﬂuence
a ﬁrm’s unit cost. Thus, the ﬁrm’s problem becomes one of maximizing proﬁts per customer that



















2−q [1 − Gij (p)] for p≤Rij,
0 otherwise.
Because each shopper expects to receive 2 − q price quotes, the probability that a customer has a
single price quote is q/(2 − q). As long as the ﬁrm’s price is below the reservation price, the ﬁrm
will sell to all customers with one price quote. By increasing its price, the ﬁrm increases its revenue
per sale but decreases the likelihood of a sale, since it increases the probability that those customers
with two price quotes have a second price quote that is lower than the ﬁrm’s price.
Burdett and Judd (1983) have shown that given a reservation price and cost of production, a
unique distribution of prices exists and that ﬁrms choose their price by randomizing over the support
of the distribution. The following proposition summarizes the characteristics of the distribution of
prices.
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Firms earn the same proﬁt by charging any price on the support of the distribution. Firms
that charge relatively high prices primarily sell to those consumers with a single price quote, while
those with relatively low prices attract more of those shoppers with multiple price quotes. Because
ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between any price, they can use Gij to choose prices by randomizing on the
support of the distribution
C. Equilibrium


















19A symmetric equilibrium is then a distribution of prices, Gij, and wages, wj;c o n s u m e r
decision rules {lj,n ij,r ij} and aggregate decision rules {Lj,N ij,R ij} in each country j = {1,2} for
each good i = {1,2,3} such that: (1) Given prices, wages, and proﬁts, consumer’s decision rules
solve the household’s problem in each country; (2) Given prices and wages, each ﬁrm chooses a price
to solve each ﬁrm’s problem; (3) Goods and labor markets clear; and (4) Individual and aggregate
decisions are consistent so that all households from the same country behave identically.
Alessandria (2002) shows that the highest price in the market equals the reservation price.
This upper bound on prices is an equilibrium because the highest priced ﬁrms have no incentive
to charge a price above the reservation price, as they would lose all sales.14 As no shopper returns
empty-handed, the marginal cost of each good in each country is the average price paid for it plus
the opportunity cost in wage income from shopping for it. At the margin the consumer is indiﬀerent
between increasing consumption by using more shoppers or a higher reservation price so that:
rij = wi + pij (rij)
This implies that the true cost of the good is equal to the nontraded search cost plus the actual
market price.
Our focus is on the relationship between prices, income and wages. Even though there are
many prices charged in each country, we focus only on the mean transaction price as this most
closely corresponds to the measure used by the national statistical agencies. By substituting the
equilibrium reservation price into the distribution of prices, we can use equation 3 to solve for the
14This would not necessarily be true if consumers from both countries could search in the same market. Some ﬁrms
would choose to sell only to those consumers from the country with the high reservation price.


















The average price for good j paid by a consumer in country i, is equal to a markup over the marginal
cost of the ﬁrm from country j. The markup depends on both the information structure of search
and the physical cost of search. Anything that leads the search cost to diﬀer across countries will
lead to diﬀerences in the mean transaction price. Holding the information structure constant, which
is summarized by q, we see that agents in a country with a low wage will, on average, purchase
goods at a lower price than agents in a country with a relatively high wage. Consequently, the
model predicts a strong relationship between prices and local wages.
Equation (6) also points out the critical diﬀerences between our model and the HBS model.
In both models, tradables may sell for diﬀerent prices across countries. In HBS, the price of tradables
may diﬀer internationally when there is a nontraded input, such as wholesale or retail distribution,
to get the good to the ﬁnal consumer. Suppose, for instance, that in each country it takes ηi unit
of local labor to get a product to a local consumer. Under perfect competition the retail price of a















Thus, HBS generates deviations from the law of one price in tradables because consumers must
purchase a nontraded good along with the traded good. In our model of pricing-to-market, the
search cost is similar to the nontraded retail or distribution costs in HBS. Unlike the case in HBS,
this search cost is borne by the consumer and through the search frictions is incorporated into the
price charged at the border.
4. Quantitative Results
In this section we compare the quantitative properties of the model to the observed deviations
from the law of one price documented for U.S. exports as well as the observed violations in absolute
PPP from the Penn World Tables. We ﬁrst show that the model can account for a substantial portion
of the deviations from the LOP and violations in absolute PPP when the productivity diﬀerence
across countries is the same in tradables and nontradables. Moreover, we ﬁnd that our model
closely matches the observed relationship between wages and prices. We then use our framework
to quantify the importance of pricing-to-market relative to the traditional HBS eﬀect arising from
productivity diﬀerences that are biased toward tradables. We ﬁnd that pricing-to-market appears
t ob et h ed o m i n a n ts o u r c eo ft h ew e l l - e s t a b l i s h e drelationship between aggregate prices and income,
accounting for approximately 62 percent of this relationship, while the traditional HBS channel
accounts for the remaining 38 percent. Finally, we use both our model of pricing-to-market and
the traditional HBS model to back out the amount productivity diﬀerences must be biased towards
tradables to generate the observed relationship between aggregate prices and income in each model.
We ﬁnd that pricing-to-market of the kind considered here substantially reduces the amount that
22technological diﬀerences must be biased toward tradables necessary to explain the data.
A. Calibration
The demand side of the economy is chosen to be consistent with the standard textbook
presentation of the HBS model (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 1996). Agents in each country are assumed
to have the following symmetric utility function:








We follow the literature and assume that preferences over tradables and nontradables are Cobb-
Douglas so that they are not very substitutable. On the other hand, tradables are often assumed to
be perfect substitutes because this eliminates the terms of trade eﬀect. We make a minor departure
from this case and choose ρ =0 .99, which makes the tradable goods almost perfect substitutes.
We calibrate the size of the tradable sector to match the import and export share of GDP for
the median of a subset of OECD countries. We use those OECD countries for which re-exports do
not appear to be too large15 and for which we have manufacturing wage data from the BLS. Table
3 summarizes the trade shares of these countries in 2000. The median country imports and exports
approximately one-third of GDP.16 To be consistent with these shares in our two-country model we
set α =2 /3 so that nontradables account for one-third of output.17 We ﬁnd that the openness of a
country does not inﬂuence our results substantially and report sensitivity to the trade share.




For our baseline case we assume that tradable and nontradable technologies are identical, so that
aT
i = aNT
i = a. Next, we assume both countries are identical so that aT
1 = aT
2 . We then examine
15This requires dropping the Netherlands, Belgium, and Ireland.
16For comparison, the median country in the Penn World Tables imported approximately 38 percent of GDP and
exported 42 percent of GDP in 2000.
17Stockman and Tesar (1995) calibrate the tradable sector to account for 50 percent of output.
23the properties of prices and income as the goods production technologies diverge across countries.
We choose (q,a), so that the average markup is 11 percent and the maximum price exceeds
the average price in the market by 25 percent. This implies that a =0 .2778 and q =0 .2857.I na l l
of our experiments, we hold the noisy search parameter constant and allow market technologies to
vary across our two countries.
B. Measuring Prices and Income
Before evaluating the model it is useful to focus on a couple of measurement issues. We base
this discussion on the data we have examined and the statistics we have computed. To begin with
we have computed the elasticity of deviations from the law of one price with respect to wages. In
our framework we measure this as an average of the size of deviations from the law of one price in












We have also measured elasticities of individual and aggregate prices with respect to income. In
this case, we have measured income both at PPP terms and at market exchange rates. To facilitate
the discussion, we focus on measuring income at PPP. We follow the convention of the Penn World
Tables and compute nominal GDP, Yi, as the sum of value-added in the ﬁnal good sector:
Yi = P1i (R1i)N1i + P2i (R2i)N2i + Pi3 (Ri3)Ni3









































C. Balanced Technology Gap
In our baseline case, we assume that the productivity gap across countries is the same in












. With tradables accounting for two-thirds of
consumption, the model generates quantitatively important deviations from the LOP and violations
from absolute PPP. The elasticity of deviations from the LOP with respect to income is approxi-
mately 17.4 percent at PPP (14.9 percent at market prices). The elasticity of violations from PPP
with respect to income is approximately 16.9 percent at PPP (14.4 percent at market prices). Thus,
our model can account for 87 percent of the deviations from the LOP and almost 44 percent of the
violations of PPP associated with income levels.
18The price index takes into account only the transaction price of the goods, not the search costs that are borne. It
is therefore analogous to the price index used in the data.
25The size of deviations from the LOP and violations of PPP diﬀer for a couple of reasons.
First, for deviations from the LOP, we take an average over the two tradable goods. Because the cost
of production of these two goods diﬀers, in general the size of deviations from the LOP will diﬀer.
To measure aggregate prices, we use the appropriate welfare-based price index. As the relative
price of the two tradables diﬀers across countries, consumption is not equally divided between these
two goods, and the welfare-based indices take this into account. Second, because tradables and
nontradables are poor substitutes, the deviations from the LOP are smaller for tradables.
Figure 3 shows that these elasticities increase slightly with the size of the tradable sector.
This occurs because the deviations from the law of one price are larger in the tradable sector.
Raising the trade share places a larger weight on the deviations from the LOP in tradables. The
larger diﬀerences in aggregate price levels also lead to smaller diﬀerences in PPP-based measures of
income, and this raises the elasticity of the LOP with respect to income. Even with a very small
tradable share of 25 percent, the model generates nearly one-third of the violations of absolute PPP
and 80 percent of the deviations from the LOP.
D. Biased Technology Gap
We now explore the impact on prices when the technology gap across countries is relatively
larger in the tradable sector. Figure 4 shows how our measures of elasticities vary with the extent
of comparative advantage in nontradables (i.e., the ratio of relative nontradable productivities to














When gN/T =0 , technological diﬀerences are completely concentrated in the tradable sector. When
gN/T =1 , there is no relative bias across sectors in technology levels. For comparison, the elasticity
26of deviations from PPP in a model without price discrimination is also reported as εSTD
PPP.
We ﬁnd that if the nontraded productivity gap is 60 percent of the traded productivity gap,
then our model of pricing-to-market can match the observed relationship between aggregate prices
and income. Without pricing-to-market, this level of bias in the technology gap would account for
approximately 38 percent of the relationship between aggregate prices and income. To get the HBS
model to match the aggregate price-income elasticity, the productivity gap in the tradable sector
must be nearly 10 times that in the nontradable sector.
Our model can match the relationship between aggregate prices and income for a relatively
small productivity gap between tradables and nontradables for the following three reasons. First, the
presence of pricing-to-market implies that all prices are lower in countries with low-income. Based on
what we ﬁnd with a balanced international productivity gap, 44 percent of the relationship between
aggregate prices and income can be explained through this channel. Next, the traditional HBS
eﬀect makes nontradables relatively more expensive in high-income countries. This eﬀect accounts
for 38 percent of the relationship between prices and income. Finally, there is an interaction between
the biased productivity gap and pricing-to-market, which accounts for the remaining 18 percent.
With biased technological progress our model generates larger deviations from the law of one price
with respect to income, εLOP =0 .207. This stronger eﬀect on deviations from the LOP occurs
because the bias in relative technological levels generates a larger gap in wages than in real income.
With bigger wage diﬀerences across countries, there is more pricing-to-market. Taken together,
this implies that pricing-to-market is a relatively more important source of the aggregate price and
income relationship than diﬀerences in the relative price of nontradables to tradables as emphasized
by HBS. However, it also implies that the HBS channel may be more important than previously
thought as it generates more pricing-to-market.
27E. Lower Trade Share
The trade share is a key determinant of the relationship between prices and income. We have
calibrated this to be consistent with the median OECD country; however, countries such as the U.S.
and Japan have considerably smaller trade shares. While we have already examined the sensitivity
of the model to the trade share in general, we now consider how the trade share inﬂuences our
results when there is biased technological progress. To do this, we assume that the tradable sector
accounts for one-third of the economy. Figure 5 reports how these elasticities vary with the amount
the productivity gap is biased towards tradables.
With a lower trade share, biased technological progress has a smaller eﬀect on real income and
al a r g e re ﬀect on prices; thus we generate substantially larger eﬀects on prices. In particular, now we
ﬁnd that if the nontradable productivity gap is approximately 77 percent of tradable productivity
gap, our model of pricing-to-market matches the elasticity of PPP with respect to income. With
this amount of bias in technological diﬀerences, the HBS model accounts for 44 percent of the
relationship between PPP and income. Thus, even with a substantially lower trade share ,we see
that pricing-to-market still appears to explain more than half of the eﬀect of income on prices.
Pricing-to-market is still the dominant source of the relationship between aggregate prices
and income because it aﬀects all goods nearly equally so that both tradables and nontradables are
less expensive in low-income countries. Raising the share of nontradables in the economy allows for
smaller diﬀerences in the ratio of the relative price of nontradables to tradables to have a larger
eﬀect on aggregate prices. However, the higher share of nontradables also generates a larger gap in
relative wages compared to real income across countries. Again, since pricing-to-market is based on
wage diﬀerentials, this strengthens the pricing-to-market eﬀect so that the elasticity of deviations
from the LOP is increasing in the share of nontradables in consumption.
285. Conclusions
This paper provides strong empirical evidence of systematic pricing-to-market based on the
wages of consumers in the destination market. Further work needs to be done to determine whether
this type of pricing-to-market is common to exports in the rest of the world. We have shown that this
pricing-to-market accounts for much of the deviations from absolute PPP in the data. In contrast
to previous work, our work ﬁnds that wages have substantially more explanatory power for national
price levels than income per capita.
We have developed a model of pricing-to-market based on international productivity diﬀer-
ences and search frictions. Our model generates a role for local wages in the price-setting behavior
of ﬁrms. We use our model to diﬀerentiate between the traditional explanation of violations of
PPP, that is, those due to relatively larger productivity diﬀerentials in the tradable sector, and ours
based on pricing-to-market. We have shown that pricing-to-market accounts for about 62 percent
of the violations from absolute PPP and 100 percent of the deviations from the LOP. In contrast,
violations of PPP due to diﬀerences in the ratio of the relative price of tradables to nontradables
across countries, as emphasized by HBS, accounts for only 38 percent of the violations of PPP.
While the ﬁndings here address the source of long-run deviations from absolute PPP, they may
also have implications for understanding ﬂuctuations in prices and real exchange rates at business-
cycle frequencies. If, as in our search model, it is indeed wages that determine the pricing-to-market
relationship, we may expect ﬁrms to respond to business cycle variations in setting their prices (see
Alessandria, 2002, for example). If instead, prices are set based on the value of consumers’ lifetime
budget constraints (for which wages and income per capita are only proxies), the pricing-to-market
we’ve uncovered may not be important for business-cycle frequencies. Thus, a topic for future
research is to distinguish between wages and other measures of wealth or income as the driving
force in this pricing-to-market relationship.
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Penn World Tables 6.1Figure 2: 
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ePPP e_LOP e_WFigure 4: Elasticity and Biased Productivity Growth
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ePPP_std ePPP_search e_LOP e_WFigure 5: Elasticity and Biased Productivity Growth
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ePPP_std ePPP_search e_LOP e_WGDP per 
Capita
Wages
All Homogeneous* Goods to Countries with BLS 
Wage Data**
582,866 1.000
0.182       
(47.2)
0.166       
(61.2)
0.021       
(3.8)
0.155       
(39.1)
Country Value<1% of Average Country Value for 
Commodity
538,104 0.999
0.198       
(51.4)
0.169       
(63.0)
0.025       
(4.5)
0.154       
(39.0)
Country Value<5% of Average Country Value for 
Commodity
442,386 0.996
0.205      
(52.8)
0.163       
(61.0)
0.047       
(8.3)





All Homogeneous* Goods to Countries with BLS 
Wage Data**
582,866 1.000
0.136       
(60.2)
0.126       
(68.5)
-0.006      
(-1.2)
0.131       
(32.7)
Country Value<1% of Average Country Value for 
Commodity
538,104 0.999
0.146       
(64.3)
0.131       
(71.2)
0.015       
(3.2)
0.120       
(30.6)
Country Value<5% of Average Country Value for 
Commodity
442,386 0.996
0.151       
(65.4)
0.130       
(70.0)
0.038       
(7.8)
0.103       
(26.0)
*Homogeneous indicates that we have dropped all commodities that included "other," "NESOI," "not elsewhere specified or included," "parts," 
and "$" in either the detailed or abridged commodity description.








Dropping Low Value Country-Commodity Observations
Dropping Low Value Country-Commodity Observations
Table 1:                                                                                           
Coefficients from Commodity-Year Fixed Effects Regressions of 




Log Price on Log Income per Capita and/or Log Wages
** These countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 












OnlyIndividual (10-Digit) Commodities 307 25,463
0.131           
(13.7)
 0.186          
(13.3)
Aggregated (9-Digit) Commodities 133 17,278
0.093           
(8.8)
 0.134          
(8.5)
Individual (10-Digit) Commodities 1,814 188,877
0.113           
(33.6)
0.156           
(31.4)
Aggregated (7-Digit) Commodities 567 94,305
0.087           
(20.1)
0.124           
(19.2)
Individual (10-Digit) Commodities 3,522 381,406
0.151           
(50.0)
0.164           
(48.3)
Aggregated (5-Digit) Commodities 844 164,448
0.100           
(30.7)




Effect of Quality Aggregation on Coefficients from 
Regressions of Log Unit Value on Log Wages
Exchange    
Rate
PPP
Commodities Combined at the 9-Digit Level
Number of 
Observations
Commodities Combined at the 5-Digit Level






















UNITED KINGDOM 0.281 0.301
UNITED STATES 0.113 0.150
median 0.327 0.332
Imports and Exports as a fraction of GDP (2000)
Table 3: Appendix A: 
Sample of 30 Randomly Selected Goods in Alphabetical Order
1 BARS & RODS OF IRON OR NONALLOY STEEL, HOT-ROLLED, IN IRREGULARLY WOUND COILS, OF 
CIRCULAR CROSS-SECTION LT 14MM DIAMETER, CONTAINING LT 0.6% CARBON
2 BOVINE LEATHER WITHOUT HAIR ON, PRETANNED EXCEPT VEGETABLE PRETANNED, BUT NOT 
FURTHER PREPARED
3 BOVINE UPPER LEATHER, WHOLE, WITHOUT HAIR ON, OF A UNIT SURFACE AREA NOT EXCEEDING 28 
SQUARE FEET (2.6 M2)
4 CHICKEN CUTS AND EDIBLE OFFAL (EXCEPT LIVERS) FROZEN
5 COPPER POWDERS OF LAMELLAR STRUCTURE; FLAKES
6 DIAMONDS, UNSORTED
7 DIISODECYL ORTHOPHTHALATES
8 ELECTRICAL SPECTROMETERS AND SPECTROGRAPHS USING OPTICAL RADIATIONS (ULTRAVIOLET, 
VISIBLE, INFRARED)
9 FERROCHROMIUM, 4 PERCENT OR LESS CARBON
10 GRINDERS, POLISHERS AND SANDERS, SUITABLE FOR METAL WORKING, ROTARY TYPE (INC 
COMBINED ROTARY-PERCUSSION) PNEUMATIC TOOLS FOR WORKING IN THE HAND
11 HOMOGENIZED COMPOSITE FOOD PREPARATIONS (SEE NOTE 3)
12 KRAFT FOLDING CARTON STOCK, CLAY COATED, BLEACHED AND OVER 95% CHEMICAL FIBERS, 
WEIGHING 150 G/M2 OR LESS, IN ROLLS OR SHEETS
13 METHYLCHLOROFORM (1,1,1-TRICHLOROETHANE)
14 MONOLITHIC I/C'S, DIGITAL, SILICON, (MOS), FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR, VOLATILE MEMORY, 
DYNAMIC READ-WRITE RANDOM ACCESS (DRAM) NOT OVER 300,000 BITS
15 OPTICAL SCANNERS AND MAGNETIC INK RECOGNITION DEVICES, ENTERED WITH THE REST OF A 
SYSTEM
16 ORIGINAL ENGRAVINGS, PRINTS AND LITHOGRAPHS, FRAMED OR NOT FRAMED
17 PAVERS, FINISHERS AND SPREADERS FOR CONCRETE, FOR PUBLIC WORKS, BUILDING OR SIMILAR USE
18 POCKET LIGHTERS, GAS FUELED, REFILLABLE
19 POLYMERS OF VINYL ACETATE, IN AQUEOUS DISPERSION
20 POWER SUPPLIES FOR ADP, SUITABLE FOR PHYSICAL INCORPORATION INTO AUTOMATIC DATA 
PROCESSING MACHINES,WITH A POWER OUTPUT NOT EXCEEDING 50W
21 SKINS OF SWINE, EXCEPT LIVERS, EDIBLE, FROZEN
22 SOBUTENE-ISOPRENE (BUTYL) RUBBER (IIR)
23 SWEET CORN, UNCOOKED OR COOKED BY STEAMING OR BOILING IN WATER, FROZEN
24 SWITCHES, PUSH-BUTTON, RATED AT NOT OVER 5 A, FOR A VOLTAGE NOT EXCEEDING 1,000 V
25 SYNTHETIC FILAMENT YARN EXCEPT SEWING THREAD, NOT FOR RETAIL SALE, SINGLE 
MONO,MULTIFILAMENT, OF POLYESTER UNTWISTED OR WITH A TWIST OF LT 5 TURNS/MTR
26 SYNTHETIC FILAMENT YARN EXCEPT SEWING THREAD, NOT FOR RETAIL SALE, SINGLE, 
MULTIFILAMENT, WITH A TWIST OF GE 5 TURNS PER M OF POLYETHYLENE, PROPYLENE
27 TABLE OR KITCHEN GLASSWARE OTHER THAN DRINKING GLASSES, OF LEAD CRYSTAL
28 TILTING ARBOR TABLE SAWS, WOODWORKING, NEW
29 TURNIP SEED OF A KIND USED FOR SOWING
30 WOVEN FABRIC OF COTTON CONTAINING LT 85% BY WEIGHT OF COTTON WEIGHING GT 200G/M2 
DYED PLAIN WEAVE POPLIN OR BROADCLOTH MIXED WITH MMFAll Homogeneous* Goods to Countries with PWT 
Income/Capita Data**
644,118 1.000
0.083      
(49.9)
0.055        
(52.3)
Country Value<1% of Average Country Value for Commodity 585,007 0.999
0.091      
(53.5)
0.059        
(55.9)
Country Value<5% of Average Country Value for Commodity 452,608 0.994
0.096      
(52.3)
0.062        
(55.2)
Additional Notes: Log incomes per capita in exchange rate terms ranged from 9.1 to 15.2 (6.2 to 10.7 in PPP terms) in 2000. 
The estimated price elasticity with respect to income in exchange rate (PPP) terms of 0.055 (0.083) would therefore imply a 
34 percent (37 percent) price difference between the richest and poorest countries.                                                                      
**The regressions include 128 countries.










*Homogeneous indicates that we have dropped all commodities that included "other," "NESOI," "not elsewhere specified or 
included," "parts," and "$" in either the detailed or abridged commodity description.  In addition, we have dropped all goods 
that did not have units listed.
Coefficients from Commodity-Year Fixed Effects Regressions of Log Price                             







2601110030 A A A IRON ORE NONAGGLOMERATED CONCENTRATES
2601110060 B A A IRON ORE NONAGGLOMERATED COARSE
2601110090 C A A IRON ORE NONAGGLOMERATED NOT COARSE
2601120030 D B A IRON ORE AGGLOMERATED PELLETS
2601120060 E B A IRON ORE AGGLOMERATED BRIQUETTES
2601120090 F B A IRON ORE AGGLOMERATED NOT PELLETS OR BRIQUETTES
7204410020 G C B NO 1 BUNDLES STEEL SCRAP
7204410040 H C B NO 2 BUNDLES STEEL SCRAP
7204410060 I C B BORINGS, SHOVELINGS AND TURNINGS STEEL SCRAP
7204410080 J C B SHAVINGS, CHIPS, MILLING WASTE, SAWDUST, FILINGS, 
TRIMMINGS, STAMPINGS STEEL SCRAP
7204490020 K D B NO 1 HEAVY MELTING STEEL SCRAP
7204490040 L D B NO 2 HEAVY MELTING STEEL SCRAP
7204490060 M D B CUT PLATE AND STRUCTURAL STEEL SCRAP
7204490070 N D B SHREDDED STEEL SCRAP
9505104010 O E C ARTIFICIAL CHRISTMAS TREES, OF PLASTIC
9505105010 P F C ARTIFICIAL CHRISTMAS TREES, EXCEPT OF PLASTIC
0203210000 Q G D CARCASSES AND HALF-CARCASSES OF SWINE, FROZEN
0203221000 R H D HAMS, SHOULDERS AND CUTS THEREOF, OF SWINE, BONE IN, 
PROCESSED, FROZEN
0203229000 S I D HAMS, SHOULDERS AND CUTS THEREOF, OF SWINE, BONE IN, 
EXCEPT PROCESSED, FROZEN
5209413000 T J E WOVEN FABRIC OF COTTON CONTAINING 85% OR MORE BY 
WEIGHT OF COTTON WEIGHING MORE THAN 200G/M2 OF 
DIFFERENT COLORS PLAIN WV CERTIFIED HAND-LOOMED 
FABRIC
5209420030 U K E WOVEN FABRIC OF COTTON CONTAINING 85% OR GT BY WEIGHT 
OF COTTON WEIGHING GT 200G/M2 OF YARNS OF DIFFERENT 
COLORS DENIM WEIGHING LE 360G/M2
5209420050 V K E WOVEN FABRIC OF COTTON CONTAINING 85% OR MORE BY 
WEIGHT OF COTTON WEIGHING 360 G/M2 OF YARNS OF 
DIFFERENT COLORS DENIM
5209430000 W L E WOVEN FABRICS OF COTTON, 85% OR MORE COTTON BY 
WEIGHT, WITH YARNS OF DIFFERENT COLORS, 3-THREAD OR 4-
THREAD TWILL INCLUDING CROSS TWILL, OVER 200 G/M2
 Random Sample of Five Quality Groupings
* A relatively small fraction (about 5 percent) of all goods are unique up to 10 digits. In the random sample of five 5-digit groups chosen, 
none of the goods were unique up to 10 digits in the Harmonized System Code.
Appendix C: